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Land Release Liability
Who should be responsible for any adverse events after clearance? The process of transferring 
liability from an operator to the state seems biased due to an inherent conflict of interest.
by Sean Moorhouse [ Mine Action Consulting ]
If a mine/explosive remnant of war (ERW) accident occurs in previously released land, who is liable for the damage caused? This is a question that many national mine action 
authorities (NMAA) ask and one that I was asked in Laos and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina during two recent workshops on liability 
in mine action, which were facilitated by the Geneva Interna-
tional Centre on Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) 
The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) guide 
mine action organizations by establishing principles and spec-
ifying international requirements in mine action. IMAS 07.11, 
Amendment No. 2, released 1 March 2013, contains important 
elements that help point the way toward answering questions 
on liability. Moreover, the amendment raises a few additional 
questions of its own, which require answers if IMAS is to be 
thoroughly implemented.
Land Release Clarification
Known for being difficult to translate into languages oth-
er than English, the term land release has become problematic 
over the years. In addition, although most people in the mine 
action community have a good understanding of land release, 
many continue to conflate land release (land determined as be-
ing safe to use) with land cancellation (land never contaminat-
ed). Combining the two concepts into one can cause confusion. 
Land release—an evidence-based threat assessment de-
termining where full clearance is or is not required—is only 
concerned with increasing the efficiency of mine action activi-
ties. Like anything in the dynamic world of mine action, land 
release is subject to constant refinements, which explains why 
the latest IMAS 07.11 came into being.
The new IMAS 07.11 describes land release as “… an ev-
idence-based decision-making process that helps determine 
with confidence which land needs further action and which 
does not. It involves the identification of hazardous areas, the 
cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduc-
tion of land through technical survey and the clearance of 
land with actual mine/ERW contamination.”1
What happens when released land is found to contain 
an unexploded device or an explosion occurs? IMAS 07.11 
uses the term adverse event to describe such incidents. 
Unfortunately, these adverse events will occur from time 
to time. Although perfection is the goal, it cannot always 
be achieved; some mines/ERW might be missed during the 
clearance process.
IMAS 07.11 contains three key elements that determine li-
ability in the event that any adverse event occurs:
•	 Reasonable effort
•	 Residual risk
•	 Transfer of liability from operator to state
IMAS 07.11 describes all reasonable effort as “… a minimum 
acceptable level of effort to identify and document contami-
nated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/
ERW. ‘All reasonable effort’ has been applied when the com-
This 13-year-old Sri Lankan boy lost his foot while working in 
his family’s garden after the area was partially cleared.
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mitment of additional resources is considered to be unreason-
able in relation to the results expected.”1
NMAA should define what actions and parameters make 
up all reasonable effort for the different processes concerned. 
For example, in areas where clearance is deemed necessary, 
national standards determine a minimum clearance depth 
and target size for clearance. For metal detectors, the target 
size is determined as the smallest piece of metal the detector 
must be able to find, to represent the signal of the mines/ERW 
being cleared. For animal detection systems, it is the smallest 
explosive trace.
The second element, residual risk, is unavoidable. A re-
sidual risk of encountering mines/ERW in any post-conf lict 
country will always exist, yet with every item found and 
destroyed, risk is reduced (albeit not entirely eliminated). 
Even in manually cleared areas, using all reasonable—or 
even unreasonable—effort, a chance always remains that an 
item was missed. Mine action’s goal is to reduce that risk to 
a tolerably low level. Each NMAA must determine its own 
risk-tolerance level.
The third and final element is the transfer of liability from 
the operator to the state. IMAS defines liability as “… any le-
gal responsibility, duty or obligation that a country, organisa-
tion or individual may have. Liability in relation to an adverse 
event, such as an accident or the discovery of a missed item in 
an area, is normally linked to non-compliance with an agreed 
policy or procedure.”1
Transfer of Liability
IMAS 07.11 assumes the operator is liable for any dam-
ages that may occur during clearance—which, although un-
derstandable, seems a little unfair. After all, the operator was 
not responsible for placing mines/ERW in the area. Worse, if 
the clearance organization had not taken all of the physical 
risks involved in clearing the devices, it would have assumed 
no liability and the land would still be contaminated. Yet in 
deciding to clear the devices—whether for profit or humani-
tarian purposes—the operator effectively becomes liable for 
any damages caused during clearance.
IMAS clarifies that the operator is liable if an accident oc-
curs during the operation, but at what point does the state as-
sume liability? In areas with no evidence of contamination, 
land is released to the community without executing any 
technical survey or full clearance. The non-technical survey 
process is specified according to national standards, imple-
mented by the operator and quality managed by NMAA. Is 
there any difference in the operator’s liability if an adverse 
event occurs in an area released without being processed?2
When land is released, regardless of the method used, a 
formal handover process should take place where the operator 
relinquishes liability to NMAA, an agent of the state. There-
fore, the responsibility should immediately transfer to the 
state when a formal handover process occurs. Additionally, li-
ability handover should be a clearly and explicitly identified 
moment in time.
On the other hand, NMAA may wish to delay this 
handover for as long as possible, so that the operator retains 
liability. This delaying tactic should not be allowed, because 
if there are concerns about the quality of the work, NMAA 
would require that the operator solve the problems and 
certify the work’s completion.
Holding an Operator Liable
However, IMAS 07.11 states that an operator will, at least in 
principle, retain some liability in cases of incidents caused by 
suspected missed mines/ERW in four circumstances. Specifi-
cally, some liability is retained if an investigation shows that
“i) the accident was caused by wilful or criminal mis-
conduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct or a con-
scious, f lagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the 
individual(s) harmed;
ii) the organisation was not properly accredited, licensed, 
certified or authorised to carry out acts leading to the errone-
ous land release decision;
iii) the organisation wilfully infringed prevailing national 
policy or standards;
iv) the organisation had conducted gross procedural errors 
or grossly deviated from an agreed land release concept.”1
A mine was found and marked in an area declared clear of 
mines in Sri Lanka.
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CWD Response to Ammunition  
   Depot Accidents
While casualties inevitably occur during wars as a result of hostilities, munitions explosions are far 
more dangerous because they can injure or kill thousands of civilians and military personnel in a 
single incident. These detonations are not a new occurrence; they have happened as far back as 
World War I.
On 6 December 1917, during World War I, nearly 2,000 people were killed and an additional 9,000 were injured in one accident, when a French am-
munition ship, the SS Mont Blanc, collided with a Norwegian 
cargo vessel, the SS Imo, in Halifax Harbor, Nova Scotia, 
Canada. The collision sparked a fire that ignited over 2,500 
tons of munitions aboard the Mount Blanc. The cargo in-
cluded 2,325 tons of picric acid, 225 tons of TNT, 21 tons of 
guncotton (nitrocellulose) and 35 tons of benzene.1 Until the 
advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, this was the largest man-
made explosion and is still the world’s largest unplanned, 
conventional munitions explosion to date, with a force equiv-
alent to 2.9 kilotons of explosives.2
During World War II, on 5 June 1941, several thousand 
people were killed in a single instance in the city of Smederevo, 
on the outskirts of Belgrade, when 400,000 tons of ammuni-
tion stored in the city center by German occupation forces 
detonated.3 Additionally, during the war period (1939–1954), 
there were at least six other major events involving munitions 
being transported or stored that were not directly attributable 
to hostile action, which resulted in nearly 2,000 deaths of mili-
tary and civilian personnel.4
by COL. George Zahaczewsky [ U.S. Army, Retired ]
QRF personnel conduct ordnance removal activities in February 2009 following a munitions depot explosion in  
Chelopechene, Bulgaria.
All photos courtesy of QRF.
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Between 1995 and May 2010, nearly 218 incidents in-
volving ammunition depots occurred, resulting in at least 
4,700 fatalities and 5,700 injuries.4,5 These instances can 
have the same detrimental effects on populations, infra-
structure and development as landmines and explosive 
remnants of war.4,5,6 Arguably the largest one of these catas-
trophes took place in Lagos, Nigeria, on 27 January 2002. 
An explosion at the Ikeja ammunition depot in the center 
of Lagos resulted in more than 1,100 civilian and military 
deaths with an additional 5,000 injured. The accident also 
displaced 20,000 people and destroyed much of the north-
ern part of the city.4,5 A fire near the depot reportedly ini-
tiated the explosion; however, other reports attribute the 
accident’s cause to the aged and deteriorated condition of 
the stored ordnance.4,5
According to the U.S. Department of State (DOS), the 
U.S. has provided assistance in promoting the safe dispos-
al of surplus weapons and aging munitions since 2001.4,5,6 
Recognizing the need to respond immediately to emer-
gency situations involving conventional weapons de-
struction (CWD), the Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement in the U.S. DOS Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs (PM/WRA) awarded DynCorp International (DI) 
a five-year contract in September 2008 to cover recruit-
ment, equipment, training and deployment costs of a quick 
reaction force (QRF) with worldwide availability.
DI provided the necessary support infrastructure, as well 
as a team of highly qualified and certified weapons remov-
al and abatement technical specialists, in order to swiftly de-
stroy conventional weapons caches and remove potentially 
deadly explosive munitions. From September 2008 through 
September 2013, QRF responded to 25 urgent situations in-
volving CWD, including three post-accident clearance oper-
ations in ammunition storage areas in Bulgaria, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Tanzania.
Bulgaria, January 2009
On 3 July 2008, a series of 11 unexplained explosions at 
the Chelopechene ammunition depot near Sofia, Bulgaria, 
rocked Chelopechene and the surrounding area. The ex-
plosions forced the evacuation of 1,700 of the 2,500 resi-
dents that lived in the town, and the airport was temporarily 
closed.7 Most of the approximately 1,600–2,500 tons of obso-
lete munitions and 15–20 tons of explosives stored at the de-
pot were damaged, constituting a danger.7,8 At the request of 
the Bulgarian government, a two-person QRF team was sent 
to Sofia on 22 November 2008 to assess the Chelopechene 
facility. Following discussions with Bulgarian officials, an 
The aftermath of a 2012 ammunition depot explosion in Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo.
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E Surplus SA/LW Destruction Project  
 in Mauritania
Handicap International, in partnership with the NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund for Mauritania, 
implemented a multiphase ammunition and conventional weapons destruction project to help the 
Mauritanian government achieve its security objectives and reduce the risk of unplanned explosions.
by Philippe Houliat [ Handicap International ]
Handicap International (HI) was founded in 1982 to bring assistance to victims of anti-personnel (AP) landmines living in the refugee camps on the bor-
der between Cambodia and Thailand. In 1997, HI was chosen 
as co-laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize for its role in the in-
ternational campaign to ban AP landmines, and HI is a key 
international player in the field of armed violence reduction. 
Among other projects, HI is lending its experience in am-
munition and conventional weapons destruction (CWD) to 
a project in Mauritania aimed at increasing civilian security 
by improving the management of the country’s weapons and 
ammunition stores.
Mauritania has experienced more than 30 years of politi-
cal instability, including 13 successful or attempted coups and 
other internal armed conflicts.1 During this time, poor secu-
rity at weapons and ammunition depots and the illicit prolif-
eration of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) heightened 
instability in the country and surrounding region.
International Cooperation and Assistance
Since joining the Mediterranean Dialogue in February 1995, 
Mauritania has secured international assistance for its CWD 
project through the NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund.2 
The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA)—now 
the NATO Support Agency (NSPA)—launched the NATO 
Trust Fund for Mauritania in 2010. Governed by a framework 
agreement, the project has three main goals:
•	 Increase the security of Mauritania’s civilian population 
by reducing the risk of ammunition and weapons theft 
from government depots
•	 Strengthen the skills of the personnel in charge of am-
munition storage management
•	 Provide training on reintegration for Mauritanian army 
personnel returning to civilian life
Under Italy’s leadership, the project is also financed by 
several other NATO countries—Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, 
the U.K. and the U.S. Although not a part of the Trust Fund, 
Germany’s financial support for HI is critical to the project’s 
mission: safe destruction of ammunition and weapons identi-
fied as decommissioned or obsolete by the Mauritanian army. 
The project’s total budget is €2.25 million (US$3,111,302 as of 
23 April 2014), and it will be completed before the end of 2014.
Destruction Campaign: Preparatory Phase
HI seconded an expatriate technical adviser to work along-
side the Mauritanian army’s explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) technicians to foster capacity building through the 
systematic and continuous transfer of skills.
Preparation of and grouping of MANPADS for 
destruction.
All graphics courtesy of the author.
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The prepatory phase of HI’s destruction campaign in-
volved setting up the NAMSA office, making initial contact 
with military authorities, finalizing procedures to access 
military depots and integrating the international expert 
into the Mauritanian destruction team. As no national reg-
ulations were in place, standard operating procedures (SOP) 
were drafted and included specific procedures for destroy-
ing man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and for 
cutting weapons. These documents were based on prevail-
ing international standards (the International Ammunition 
Technical Guidelines and International Small Arms Control 
Standards), and the government of Mauritania approved 
them on 1 June 2011.
Because of the distances between the 20 separate ammu-
nition depots that needed clearing, destruction operations 
were grouped to 12 sites. This reduced transport costs and op-
timized available logistical resources. Additionally, the four 
EOD technicians in charge of destruction organized two 
weeks of refresher training and focused on security measures 
to be applied during destruction and burning activities.
Ammunition Destruction Phase
The destruction phase lasted from June 2011 to March 
2012 and eliminated 1,963 tons of ammunition of all calibers. 
In the course of these activities, the EOD team covered 19,534 
km (12,138 mi) while traveling to the 12 destruction sites lo-
cated throughout Mauritania. A mechanical digger created 
335 demolition pits, and with supervision of an HI expert, the 
Mauritanian military hand-dug the pits when the destruc-
tion zone was too isolated to allow transport of the mechani-
cal digger.
Detonation destroyed ammunition calibers greater than 
or equal to 20 mm, including MANPADS, because other tech-
niques were unavailable in the country. To optimize priming 
of explosions, the EOD team used obsolete anti-tank land-
mines. The concurrent- and post-recording processes used 
during MANPADS destruction corresponded with NATO op-
erating procedures.
As no available incinerator could destroy the 820 tons of 
ammunition of 14.5 mm caliber or more within a reasonable 
timeframe, an open burning technique was employed. SOP 
was to dig 1 m x 2.5 m x 1.5 m (1 yd x 2.7 yd x 1.6 yd) burn pits 
in which large quantities of cartridges could be destroyed at 
once. The metallic waste after combustion was recycled.
SA/LW Elimination Phase
SA/LW elimination activities began with identifying suit-
able premises for destruction operations, which were then 
rehabilitated to align with international standards. The spe-
cific destruction equipment, including an oxyacetylene cut-
ting system, a metal-cutting chainsaw and personal protective 
equipment, was then purchased and installed.
Cutting operators were trained in
•	 Identifying and recording SA/LW for destruction
•	 Using cutting tools
•	 Drafting destruction reports consistent with SOPs
•	 Recycling metallic waste
Lastly, with the assistance of HI’s expert, a dismantling 
plan was drawn up for the 2,300 SA/LW; the Mauritanian 
army then implemented it.
Overview of the NATO Project
Constructing NATO-standard ammunition depots. In west-
ern Mauritania, two new depots were built in Aleg and Akjoujt 
to international standards in order to replace the 20 storage 
sites spread across the country, one of which used to be locat-
ed in the capital, Nouakchott. These can store approximately 
750 tons of ammunition.
Training in ammunition depot management. This train-
ing’s purpose was to provide 20 storekeepers and six managers 
of ammunition depots with the technical knowledge needed 
to manage ammunition safely and efficiently. The training was 
delivered in Arabic and French over a period of three weeks 
and focused on storage procedures, management and ac-
counting, as well as the safe handling, maintenance and elim-
ination of ammunition.
Reintegrating military personnel. Intended to help former 
military and internal security personnel return to civilian life, 
this component is an important step in strengthening relations 
between the army and civil society. HI helped set up training 
courses in five trades: carpentry, electricity, masonry, plumb-
ing and welding. By the end of 2013, 145 former soldiers, aged 
23 to 62 years old had participated in training sessions.
N° Category Origin Quantity (units) Weight (tons)
1 Cartridge <_ 20 mm various 11,167,649 820
2 Shell 23 to 75 mm various 54,453 79
3 Shell 90 to 122 mm various 14,076 758
4 Mortar various 48,342 272
5 Rocket various 589 7
6 Grenade various 10,229 4.22
7 Mine various 2,329 14
8 Explosive various 42 0.01
9 Pyrotechnic items various 2,545 2
10 Missile various 444 7
  TOTAL   133,049 1,963.23
Figure 1. Summary of ammunition destroyed.
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Building National EOD Capacity  
 in Mali
Since January 2013, the United Nations Mine Action Service has worked to build Mali’s national 
capacity in explosive ordnance disposal.
by Jin-Hee Dieu [ UNMAS ]
Recent and ongoing armed conflicts in Mali have re-sulted in small arms and light weapons proliferation and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamina-
tion, threatening civilians and impeding stabilization efforts. 
In the northern affected communities, ERW contamination 
increases risks of accidents and injury, and hinders the safe 
return of more than 170,000 refugees and 187,000 internally 
displaced persons.1 
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has 
operated in Mali since January 2013 with the principal goal of 
enhancing Mali’s national capacity to mitigate the explosive 
threats that emerged following the outbreak of armed con-
flict in 2012.2 UNMAS coordinates training activities with 
the Malian Defense and Security forces and operates under 
the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in Mali (MINUSMA), which the U.N. Security Council estab-
lished in April 2013.3
Historical tensions in northern Mali and border fighting 
between Tuareg tribes created thousands of refugees. The in-
stability and conflict progressed until Alpha Oumar Konaré 
Participants from the Malian Defense Security Forces receive their EOD Level 1 training certificates.
Photo courtesy of UNMAS/Marc Vaillant.
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became president in 1992 and issued a peace agreement al-
leviating ethnic disputes.4 However, the political stability 
in Mali was disturbed again during a 2012 rebellion within 
the northern region.5 At the start of 2012, insurgents gained 
control of the Malian army’s weaponry, leaving civilians and 
militants at risk.6 Fatalities of Malian armed forces during 
Islamist insurgent attacks yielded a military coup ousting 
former President Amadou Toumani Touré in March 2012.7 
The administration and military were then reorganized. 
UNMAS continues responding to these changes and provid-
ing assistance to Malian authorities as they work to restore 
peace and security.
Addressing the Explosive Threat in Mali
Improvised explosive devices, ERW and landmines af-
fect livelihoods—especially agricultural activities—restrict 
freedom of movement and inhibit economic recovery within 
northern Mali. ERW contamination also limits the deploy-
ment of national and international forces tasked with stabiliz-
ing the north and consolidating security. UNMAS technical 
assistance enhances awareness of this threat and equips units 
to address this danger.
UNMAS aims to build Mali’s capacities to plan, lead and 
conduct explosive ordnance clearance. To this end, UNMAS 
and various partners provided explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) training for Malian military engineer units, gendar-
merie, national police, civil protection force, national guard 
and air force. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB in 
Swedish) provided the initial training, which ran from February 
to March 2013, and taught 36 participants about EOD method-
ologies, safety procedures, and types of ammunition and their 
components. MSB coordinated the second training session in 
A simulation exercise in a city environment. After having secured a safe perimeter, the trainee is creating a safe path to the 
suspicious car.
Photo courtesy of UNMAS/Donat Blugeon.
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Arms Management and Destruction  
 in Sahel and Maghreb
Increased illicit weapons proliferation after the 2011 conflict in Libya has contributed to insecurity 
throughout the Sahel and Maghreb regions in Africa, which has led to demands for regional arms 
management and destruction programs such as one implemented by MAG (Mines Advisory Group).
by Chris Loughran, Julia Wittig and Greg Crowther [ MAG (Mines Advisory Group) ]
Human security in the Sahel and Maghreb regions in Africa has deteriorated in recent years as a result of armed violence. The prevalence of non-state armed 
groups that often operate regionally has exacerbated weak 
state control over remote and border areas. For actors operat-
ing in the arms management and destruction sector, address-
ing fragility in this context requires innovative and integrated 
approaches to building stability and resilience.1
Instability and state fragility contributes to and enables 
the growing proliferation of weapons and ammunition in 
the Sahel and Maghreb regions. The increased availability of 
weapons to non-state armed groups allows them to engage 
more effectively with poorly equipped and poorly trained na-
tional armed forces, particularly in border areas, and to con-
solidate control over large swathes of countries such as Mali 
and Niger. Similarly, arms are more likely to be diverted to the 
illicit market when responsible institutions lack capacity and 
accountability. Criminal groups may seize weapons or securi-
ty sector personnel may sell them.
In this complex and dynamic environment, consider-
ing fragility, stability and resilience at a regional level is in-
creasingly important when analyzing the context and need 
for arms management and destruction in project design. Pro-
grams also have increased value when they link to security 
sector reform initiatives and complement civil society efforts 
to develop community based solutions to armed violence and 
illicit weapons.
Conflict, Fragility and Proliferation
The flow of illicit weapons and ammunition across the 
Sahel and Maghreb regions is not a new phenomenon. 
Criminal groups have long exploited established transnation-
al trading networks to assist in the movement of drugs, arms 
and other contraband.2 These criminal networks are often 
linked informally or formally to state actors and non-state 
armed groups.3 This interrelationship between transnation-
al organized crime, terrorism and conflict is a core enabler 
in the supply and demand of illicit weapons and ammunition 
throughout the region.
Libya’s 2011 conflict increased instability in the region, 
especially in Mali. Significant numbers of trained fighters 
armed with Libyan weaponry crossed the border following 
the overthrow of Moammar Gadhafi’s regime. In parallel, 
the inability of transitional authorities in Libya to establish 
The Sahel and Maghreb regions are found in northern Africa.
Map courtesy of the U.S. Library of Congress.
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control over weapons stores and munition depots led to sig-
nificant diversion and a rapid increase in the availability and 
quantity of illicit arms. Specific arms identified include BM-
21 multiple-launch rocket systems, recoilless rifles and OG-82 
rockets with anti-personnel warheads.4
The consequences of Mali’s increased level of conflict in-
clude population displacement and escalating levels of po-
litical tension throughout the region. The situation remains 
volatile, despite the intervention of French military forces and 
subsequent deployment of the U.N. Multidimensional Inte-
grated Stabilization Mission in Mali under Security Council 
resolution 2100 in April 2013.5
The links between the conflicts in Libya and fragility in 
Mali are clear, but the flow of weapons across porous borders 
within the Sahel and Maghreb regions also has wide-ranging 
implications for broader regional stability. Human Rights 
Watch Emergency Director Peter Bouckaert noted in 2011 
that “weapon(s) proliferation out of Libya is potentially one 
of the largest we have ever documented—2003 Iraq pales 
by comparison—and so the risks are equally much more 
significant.”6 The In Amenas terrorist attack in Algeria 
was launched in part from Libya using Libyan weapons.7 
Similarly, the ready availability of arms has exacerbated 
border clashes related to smuggling in recent years across the 
borders of Chad, Libya and Niger.8 Increased terrorist activity 
in southern Tunisia and Egypt relies in part on the availability 
of significant amounts of weapons flowing out of Libya.9
Arms Management and Destruction
Increased awareness of the regional implications of 
poorly managed national stockpiles and of the role illicit 
weapons play in sustaining and fueling armed violence has 
led to a growing focus on reducing illicit availability of arms. 
Many states request assistance from the international donor 
community and specialist agencies, such as MAG (Mines 
Advisory Group), to identify and implement projects aimed at 
improving weapons and ammunition management practices.
MAG has extensive experience implementing arms man-
agement and destruction programs in a range of countries in-
cluding Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, 
Somalia and South Sudan.10 This includes the destruction of 
surplus weapons and munitions; rehabilitation, relocation 
and construction of armories and munitions stores; training 
of armorers and ammunition storage personnel; and capacity 
building of managers and leaders. Initial assistance projects 
often focus on low-cost, high-impact improvements that act 
as a basis for more sustained, long-term efforts to build na-
tional capacity and infrastructure.
Weakened national infrastructure in some locations where 
MAG provides assistance means that society and communi-
ty institutions take primary responsibility for daily security. 
In these cases, with approval of relevant authorities, MAG 
also works with communities to address the effects of un-
guarded weapons and munitions by delivering risk education, 
which reduces small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) asso-
ciated risks and promotes safe storage. This form of support, 
pioneered in Somalia, normally includes initiatives that aim 
to reduce the risk of small arms accidents within communi-
ties. Both activities raise awareness of potential consequences 
and help reduce intentional and unintentional risk-taking be-
havior. While SA/LW risk education is relatively easy to adapt 
across regions and borders, other aspects of arms manage-
ment and destruction programs are politically sensitive and 
need to be tailored according to local circumstances.
Context analysis and continued stakeholder engagement 
are central elements of successful assistance projects. Pro-
grams not rooted in these principles have little chance of de-
livering long-term successes. Prospects for sustainability are 
greatest when national authorities engage at multiple levels. 
Even when training is delivered at the local or small-unit lev-
el, senior leadership and political engagement and support 
are critical.
Furthermore, regions benefit from partnerships be-
tween actors involved in arms management and destruction, 
Coast guard armory built by MAG in Berbera, Somaliland, 
in 2013. Armories are furnished with lockable gun racks 
and armory managers are trained in safety procedures. In 
this photo, an armory manager takes a coast guard officer’s 
weapon card to the numbered slot in a gun rack to retrieve 
his assigned weapon.
Photo courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.
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Promoting Firearms Marking in 
 Latin America and the Caribbean
Marking firearms is an important step in combating illicit weapons trafficking. To promote 
marking and tracing among countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Organiza-
tion of American States has strengthened national capacities to mark firearms by provid-
ing equipment and related training since 2009.
by Lourdes Rincón [ Organization of American States ]
In the last decade, more than one million people died in Latin America and the Caribbean as a result of crimi-nal violence.1 Moreover, according to statistical infor-
mation on citizen security provided by members of the 
Organization of American States (OAS), 75 percent of in-
tentional homicides in the Americas were committed 
with a firearm. The proportion of intentional homicides 
by firearms was even higher for South America and Central 
America, at 83 percent and 78 percent, respectively.2
Despite significant progress made in consolidating 
democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean during 
the last decades, the countries of the region still face con-
siderable challenges in tackling armed violence. Public 
security constitutes a high priority for citizens and re-
gional government authorities.
Numerous factors contribute to armed violence 
such as weak governance, poverty, rapid urbaniza-
tion and a lack of employment opportunities. How-
ever, easy access to illicit firearms is undoubtedly one 
of the main factors.
Adopted in 1997, the Inter-American Convention 
against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related 
Materials (CIFTA) provides a regional framework for 
addressing the control and management of firearms as a 
necessary step for ensuring greater citizen security and 
reducing armed violence. As the technical secretariat for 
CIFTA, the OAS Department of Public Security (OAS-
DPS) implemented corresponding efforts to support OAS 
member states in fulfilling their obligations to adopt leg-
islative measures criminalizing the illicit manufacturing 
and trafficking of firearms under domestic law. CIFTA 
requires firearms to be marked upon manufacture and 
importation to ensure the security of national firearms 
stockpiles, as well as the exchange of information with 
other CIFTA signatories with respect to national control 
mechanisms and illicit-trafficking patterns.
Permanently marking a firearm with identifiable 
information, such as a serial number, name, place of 
manufacturer or importer, model, and caliber, is con-
sidered an important step in combating illicit firearms 
trafficking. Marked items are easier to trace and link 
to crimes in which they were used, thus increasing law 
enforcement and prosecutorial capabilities. By increas-
ing tracing abilities, states are able to identify trafficking 
routes and arms traffickers more effectively, and can 
prosecute them accordingly.
OAS and Firearms Marking
Beginning in September 2009, OAS-DPS implement-
ed the project Promoting Firearms Marking in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. With initial and subse-
quent contributions totaling US$1,182,493 from the 
Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. 
Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 
(PM/WRA), OAS-DPS sought to strengthen national ca-
pacities to mark imported, exported or confiscated fire-
arms in accordance with CIFTA legal requirements.
Through this project, beneficiary countries were eli-
gible to receive at least one dot-peen marking machine, 
which uses small dots to mark products for identifica-
tion, related equipment and training.3 To do so, inter-
ested countries needed to agree to the terms outlining 
the equipment’s maintenance and use by signing a 
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a victim assistance unit as specified in their strategic plan, 
titled Safe Path Forward. The plan calls for the creation 
and management of a national database for landmine/UXO 
incidents. Such a database will not only depict which areas to 
prioritize for clearance and mine risk education (MRE) tasks 
but also the number of survivors and their specific needs. This 
information will then be factored into future public health 
initiatives.11 UXO-NRA has conducted the Lao National 
UXO Victim and Accident Phase 1 Survey, which identified 
particular areas with high concentrations of UXO incidents 
and recurring characteristics of survivors such as activities, 
occupations, age and gender.12
Disability Rights in Laos
While ratifying the CRPD is undoubtedly a step toward 
the fulfillment of disability rights, the focus on disability 
rights is not a new trend in Laos. Laos passed several nation-
al laws addressing issues disabled people face. As a result of 
its revision in 2003, the Laotian Constitution now guaran-
tees that disabled persons will receive social security bene-
fits and receive time off work in the event of incapacitation 
or disability.13
Additional national laws, such as the amended Labour Law 
of Lao People’s Democratic Republic of 2006, further address 
issues disabled people encounter. This legislation encourages 
employers to give disabled persons positions with pay compa-
rable to other workers and calls for employers to provide as-
sistance to those disabled during work or while commuting. 
Those who fail to comply with this law may receive a warning 
or fine, have their business suspended or license revoked, and 
legal action may be taken against them. While the law does 
address issues such as providing suitable jobs and aid in the 
case of work-related disability, it fails to protect disabled peo-
ple in areas such as workplace discrimination. The law states 
that the employer and the employee should mutually benefit 
without “discrimination as to race, nationality, gender, age, 
religion, beliefs and socio-economic status.”14 Missing from 
this clause, as well as other national legislation, is any ex-
plicit prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability. 
Because disability-based discrimination is not explicitly pro-
hibited, legal action cannot remedy such situations.15
In 1995, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a decree 
establishing the National Committee for Disabled People 
(NCDP).16 However, the roles and responsibilities of NCDP 
are not clearly outlined in the decree. A second decree 
was passed in 2009, shortly after Laos signed the CRPD, 
aligning the responsibilities of NCDP with the convention’s 
requirement for structure to “promote, protect, and monitor 
the implementation” of the CRPD.7 The decree further 
clarified that NCDP is to coordinate disability-related policies 
and programs in Laos, conduct nationwide needs surveys and 
produce statistics depicting the distribution of various types 
of disabilities and disabled peoples’ needs.16 NCDP has the 
advantage of access to government-controlled information 
channels such as newspapers, radio broadcasts and television.15
Challenges for Disabled People 
To fully participate within society, often disabled people 
must overcome physical and attitudinal barriers. In Laos, 
many live in rural settings where rough roads and topog-
raphy limit mobility. Weather indirectly, yet significantly, 
impacts disabled people in Laos. During the rainy seasons, 
numerous rural roads become nearly impassable by foot. 
Many public and commercial buildings feature a set of front 
A child looks out of a window of a house that uses bombies 
to hold down the roof. The prevalence of UXO in Laos is a pri-
mary cause of the high rate of disabled people in the country.
Photo courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.
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assessing country-specific conditions, designing a transition 
plan, developing an implementation plan and monitoring 
progress throughout the process.1
Although the degree of control transferred from a mine 
action program to national authorities can vary, GICHD de-
fines transition as “the process through which the interna-
tional community reduces its financial and technical support, 
as the affected state develops the required national pro-
gramme management capabilities that lead to national own-
ership.”1 Notably, the transition process is not an end goal, nor 
does it mark the end of international cooperation. From the 
U.N.’s point of view, transition simply characterizes sustain-
able development, which is often a prerequisite for meeting 
mandate objectives.
H. Murphey (Murf) McCloy, an expert on post-conflict and 
conventional weapons destruction with the Office of Weapons 
Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bu-
reau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), explains that the 
overall goal of centralizing control of mine action within the 
state is threatened by the issue of multiple mine action pro-
grams. This can be remedied through the presence of an or-
ganization acting as a coordinating authority.2 According to 
McCloy, this means that “the arrangements/compromises nec-
essary to centralize control of mine action within the state and 
keep separate programs from operating independently are eas-
ier to achieve.”2 In the event that local authorities or non-state 
actors exercise control in a loosely defined area independent 
of national authorities, non-state actors may maintain more 
influence in their local domains than authorities acting on 
behalf of the national government and will often see the finan-
cial benefits of independent programs, therein rendering the 
centralization of control impossible.2 While otherwise coun-
terintuitive, a program truly seeking self-sufficiency must be 
integrated into the government structure. GICHD ex-
plicitly states that “transition requires a commitment 
of more national resources with a parallel reduction of 
external assistance.”1 In other words, states must con-
sciously decide to support transition while compensating 
for reduced international funding to become successfully 
self-sufficient.
After making the decision in April 2001 to transition, 
Azerbaijan successfully transferred its mine action ca-
pacity to national ownership by 2004. Through its expe-
rience, the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 
(ANAMA) suggested that transition processes require 
three basic elements: “a decision as to what should be 
developed as the capacity of the programme, … a gov-
ernment decision to nationalize the programme, with a 
reasonable timeframe in which to gain experience under su-
pervision and then assume responsibility,” and “a strong na-
tional manager who understood the process.”3 According to 
PM/WRA, ANAMA’s ability to fund program needs inter-
nally and on a long-term basis is perhaps the strongest indi-
cator of the organization’s success.
In most countries, transition may take longer than in 
Azerbaijan. In very impoverished countries, national author-
ities may not consider national ownership of a mine action 
program to be a priority. For countries suffering from dev-
astated infrastructures and crippled economies, compensat-
ing for the withdrawal of external support from mine action 
programs is never easy. However, when international commu-
nity partners recognize and respect the host nation’s sover-
eignty, authorities will often feel empowered and remain more 
disposed to develop their own capabilities in a constructive 
partnership with the international community.2 Alternatively, 
in situations where the relationship between the host nation 
and international partner was formed under highly autocratic 
conditions, local ownership becomes significantly more diffi-
cult to achieve.2
On behalf of the state, leadership must be interested 
in and capable of fulfilling clearance obligations.1 Hence, 
to achieve a local buy-in, international donors should 
first select implementing partners that can empower local 
national leadership.2 Authorities must also possess a clear 
understanding of implementation challenges as well as the 
financial, technical and human resources necessary to fulfill 
Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines 
and on Their Destruction.1 Therefore, donors benefit from 
communicating with implementing partners and enforcing 
Mechanical demining in Laos.
Photo courtesy of MAG/Sean Sutton.
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Kurdistan’s Erbil Mine Action Center
The Erbil Mine Action Center (EMAC) of the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency increases mine risk 
education efforts in the spring to reduce high casualty rates during this season. EMAC also con-
ducts landmine clearance in Iraqi Kurdistan.
by Jamal J. Hussein [ Erbil Mine Action Center ]
The spring season is a busy time in the Iraqi Kurdistan region. Several national holidays, such as Newroz (Kurdish New Year), fall between March 
and April, and many Kurds celebrate by enjoying picnics 
in mountain locations, green areas and along riverbanks. 
Similarly, many residents begin planting crops and gath-
ering herbs in the spring, an act that often occurs near or 
within contaminated areas. These outdoor activities result 
in an increased number of injuries from landmines and ex-
plosive remnants of war (ERW) during the spring. 
Erbil Mine Action Center’s Role
To reduce the number of casualties, the Erbil Mine Ac-
tion Center (EMAC) at the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action 
Agency (IKMAA) increased mine risk education (MRE) 
activities in the spring. Funded by the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG), EMAC issues safety instructions and 
MRE teams perform special awareness training in mine and 
ERW affected areas.
KRG provides all sustainable funding for mine action 
in the Kurdistan region. At IKMAA’s request, some short-
duration projects, such as MRE and trainings, received 
limited funding from outside parties (e.g., UNICEF, 
Handicap International and the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining). Funding from outside agencies 
is not a reliable and ongoing source; funds received vary from 
year to year.
Delivering MRE
MRE teams are composed of locally trained staff that fol-
low MRE awareness guidelines provided by EMAC. Beginning 
the first week of March and continuing until the end of April, 
teams conduct one special MRE session per affected district, 
making an effort to reach residents and nomadic families.
Each district in Kurdistan has its own security checkpoint. 
The MRE team provides posters and other MRE instruction 
to all persons passing through checkpoints. Through tele-
vision, radio, security checkpoints and community presen-
tations, MRE teams can effectively communicate MRE to 
villagers and communities prior to the spring season.
In spring 2012, EMAC visited 72 villages to deliver MRE 
and distributed more than 4,600 leaflets, booklets, posters, 
landmine photos and instructions, which benefited more 
than 2,000 men, women and children. In March 2013, these 
numbers were halved due to snow, rain and other inclement 
weather; therefore, MRE teams could not reach all planned 
targets. However, villagers responded positively and the ca-
sualty rate dropped during the spring seasons of 2011–2013 in 
targeted areas, suggesting that MRE awareness trainings may 
have made a difference.
EMAC also conducts MRE sessions for schoolteachers and 
students as needed, depending on available funding. In 2012, 
Remnants of bones in the minefield at Choman district, Iraq 
(July 2013).
All graphics courtesy of the author.
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To meet these objectives, most nations operate one or more 
EOD schools. In the Asia-Pacific region, EOD schools contin-
ue to request donor assistance for facility and infrastructure 
improvement, curriculum development and third-party tech-
nical advisers and instructors. These assistance packages of-
ten lack affordable and effective hands-on training materials.
Inert ordnance training aids from Golden West Humani-
tarian Foundation’s (Golden West) extensive library are often 
requested by humanitarian operators. Unfortunately, due to 
factors detailed in this report, distribution of these materi-
als is limited. Golden West has struggled to find a solution to 
this problem.
The Advanced Ordnance Teaching Materials (AOTM) pro-
gram aims to close the gap between the availability and need 
for EOD education, and endeavors to bring a set of universal-
ly applicable training materials to the EOD community. Ulti-
mately, by improving the quality of EOD instruction, AOTM 
will increase operator safety within the profession.
Training Aids
The highest quality training aids currently available are 
created by removing explosive materials from live ordnance, 
a practice known as inerting. The closest alternative to inert 
ordnance are replicas made from various materials, such as 
plastic or wood, that seek to replicate the original appearance 
of ordnance. In programs where neither of these resources are 
available, classrooms rely on paper or electronic representa-
tions. Even when physical training aids are available, the ab-
sence of professional teaching tools or materials may mean 
that these aids are not used to full potential.
Inert ordnance. Inert ordnance training aids are hand-
made craft products. Because quality, functionality and ap-
pearance vary significantly, the products have inconsistent 
instructional value. Other issues associated with inert train-
ing aids include:
1. Limited supply of donor ordnance
2. Requirement of highly specialized technicians  
for production
3. Inherent risk to technicians
4. Labor-intensive craftsmanship (2–20 or more hours for 
one item)
5. International shipping regulations that severely  
limit distribution
Due to significant demand for these products, as well 
as the issues listed above, inert ordnance training aids 
cannot be distributed in quantities meeting the global need. 
Additional factors limit usefulness of inert ordnance for 
basic-level EOD training:
1. The complexity and small size of internal mechanisms 
obscures tactile observation of the device’s function.
2. The fragility of inert ordnance prevents repeated disas-
sembly, which is particularly acute in complex mecha-
nisms (fuzes were never designed for disassembly).
3. Conventional machining and fuze composition limits 
the degree to which the device can be cut away to expose 
functional components.
Replicas. Ordnance replicas generally consist of one or 
more parts that amalgamate the fuzing mechanisms of the 
item they represent. Replicas are commonly nonfunctioning; 
the components representing any fuze mechanisms have very 
limited or no mechanical functionality relative to the item 
they represent.
Typical production of replica ordnance employs hobby 
techniques such as silicone mold production for resin casting, 
while wood turning and other labor-intensive methods have 
also been used. Historically, lack of cost-effective fabrication 
methods for small-batch production limits manufacture of 
mechanically complex replicas.
Replicas excel at representing mechanically simple items 
such as projectile bodies, improvised explosive devices and 
simple ordnance fuzing (such as mines utilizing Bellville 
The SOTS instructor support materials are based on active 
learning pedagogy, which requires students to be active par-
ticipants in the learning process. One exercise presented in 
this approach is to let students assemble the models before re-
ceiving instruction and then allow students to explain how they 
think it operates.
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springs).1 There is a notable market 
absence for items such as mechanical 
time fuzes.
Due to the accuracy of their ex-
ternal appearance, replicas are pri-
marily useful for teaching ordnance 
identification during basic-level EOD 
education. Ordnance identification is 
important but does not substitute for a 
comprehensive understanding of fuze 
functioning. Moreover, the current 
range of capabilities represented in 
most replicas cannot adequately illus-
trate fuze functionality.
Publications. Publications are a 
pillar of EOD education and one of 
the most valuable resources available 
to field operators. The humanitarian 
community primarily relies on pub-
lications such as ORDATA II and un-
classified military documents.2 While a 
critical source of information about specific ordnance items 
for advanced EOD operators, publications have significant 
limitations for teaching basic fuze functionality to entry- 
level trainees.
The level of formal education among EOD students in 
post-conflict developing nations, in which the majority of 
the sector’s work takes place, is another factor limiting use-
fulness of publications for entry-level education. In countries 
with low exposure to formal education and literacy (such as 
Cambodia and its civil-war generation), Golden West EOD 
instructors found that traditional teaching methods rely-
ing on written materials are significantly more difficult than 
“hands-on” methods. Even in countries where students accli-
mate to using print sources, the value of physical training ma-
terials remains undisputed.
AOTM Approach
AOTM identifies two distinct categories for ordnance 
training materials
1. Aids that teach generic ordnance and fuze functionality 
(PIBD, MT, BD, etc.)
2. Aids that teach ordnance-specific functionality (i.e., 
how an MJ-1 rocket fuze functions, etc.)
AOTM addresses both categories. The first deals with 
generalized fuze functionality, which is a universal require-
ment for all basic EOD education and is addressed through 
creation of a Standard Ordnance Training Set (SOTS). This 
set includes 10 models representing the most common fuzing 
mechanisms found in ordnance. While these mechanisms are 
true to generic fuze functionality, they are not specific to any 
single fuze design.
SOTS includes a comprehensive set of instructional resourc-
es to ensure students receive the best possible education. These 
support materials include lesson plans, multimedia materi-
als (i.e., PowerPoint presentation slides), quizzes and exercises. 
The set also includes open-source reference materials. The en-
tire SOTS package is delivered in a single Pelican CaseTM for easy 
transport and storage in field conditions worldwide.
The SOTS package is tailored to meet the learning objectives 
of the European Committee for Standardization Workshop 
Agreement (CWA) for EOD Competency Standards for Human-
itarian Mine Action Levels 1 and 2.3 This training set addresses 
CWA EOD Knowledge Base Competency Standards for
•	 Explosive ordnance recognition
•	 Explosives theory and safe handling of explosives 
Addressing specific fuzes, the second category of training 
models is more applicable to high-risk munitions where EOD 
operators need precise knowledge. Another application trains 
EOD teams on threats specific to their area of responsibil-
ity. To serve these purposes, AOTM is building a database 
of 3-D ordnance models true to the original items. Some of 
the models are ready, but the goal is for the database to con-
tinue growing and serving the community’s needs. These can 
A student from the Cambodian Mine Action Centre explores the mechanism in a 
vane armed bomb fuze during IMAS EOD level 1 training.
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Using MINEHOUND in  
 Cambodia and Afghanistan
The HALO Trust uses the MINEHOUND dual sensor detector in Cambodia and Afghanistan to reduce false-
alarm rates. MINEHOUND combines a metal detector with ground-penetrating radar to improve efficiency 
of mine removal in areas highly contaminated with metallic false alarms.
by David Daniels [ Cobham Technical Services ], Jürgen Braunstein [ Vallon GmbH ] and Michael Nevard [ The HALO Trust ]
The vast majority of humanitarian mine clearance is conducted by manual deminers primarily using metal detectors. Increas-ing clearance rates of manual deminers is one of the prima-
ry ways organizations can improve effectiveness and efficiency. For this 
purpose, The HALO Trust (HALO) has used MINEHOUND VMR2 and 
VMR3 dual sensor landmine detectors in Cambodia since 2010 and in 
Afghanistan since 2012. The detector proved to be an adaptable and reli-
able means of increasing manual clearance rates.
MINEHOUND is comprised of an integrated metal detector (MD) 
designed, developed and manufactured by Vallon GmbH, and ground-
penetrating radar (GPR) designed and developed by ERA Technolo-
gy (now Cobham Technical Services or CTS). The integrated MD was 
first produced in 2004 and has been continuously improved to meet 
the needs of demining operators. Vallon and CTS collaborated to con-
duct initial HALO field trials in Cambodia. Since 
2012, the U.S. Army’s Humanitarian Demining 
Research and Development (HD R&D) Program, 
which extended the project to Afghanistan, have 
also supported them.
Development
ERA Technology started developing the 
dual sensor MINEHOUND detector in 2001 
based on its expertise in the use of radar for 
landmine detection and by careful observation 
of humanitarian deminers in action. The aim was 
to fully utilize the deminer’s skill while avoiding 
the complexity involved in operating current 
hand-held GPR systems and reducing reliance 
on software-driven auto-calibration. Using a 
radically different approach from conventional 
GPR designs regarding user interface, the detector 
employs a novel, audio-interface technique.
The original prototype detector combined 
output from an off-the-shelf MD and an ERA 
Technology-developed GPR with the design aim 
of offering considerable improvements in detec-
tion performance and a significant reduction in 
false alarms. A key element in the design philoso-
phy was the need to avoid an expensive, complex 
and potentially distracting image display and to 
implement GPR design that mimics operation 
of a conventional MD. This was achieved using 
an audio output in which the pitch of the output 
represents target depth and amplitude represents 
target size. The U.K. Department for Interna-
tional Development sponsored the initial trial element of the MINE-
HOUND project, and proving trials were carried out in Angola, Bosnia 
and Cambodia between 2005 and 2006.
As the initial trials were successful in live minefields, focus shifted 
from demonstrating the dual sensor technology (i.e., MD and GPR) to 
simplifying it for nonscientific operators. Prototypes from 2001 to 2005 
were A, B, C and D models, indicating the technology’s advancement. 
The D model was MINEHOUND VMR1, first produced in November 
2005. GPR setup required a laptop, which was linked to the detector via a 
cable. Since multiple setups were needed throughout the day, setup pro-
cedure was too cumbersome for routine detector usage.1
In July 2006, MINEHOUND VMR2 was fielded; this was the first 
operable MINEHOUND without using external devices. Due to its ca-
pacity for finding not only objects containing metal but completely 
A MINEHOUND VMR2 is used to find AP mines in Cambodia. The use of this system allows 92% 
of signals from metallic rubbish to be rapidly excavated.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
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metal-free objects too, VMR2 was useful during searches for improvised 
explosive devices or their components.
After VMR2 proved successful, Vallon developed a lighter version 
using plastic injection-molded casings for the main electronic com-
partment. At the same time, CTS developed a more powerful GPR sub-
system, allowing for implementation of more sophisticated algorithms 
for signal processing. Vallon and CTS modernized the display and fur-
ther facilitated the operation, which was integrated into MINEHOUND 
VMR3. Production of VMR3 started in May 2010.
Technology
MINEHOUND combines advanced technology—a dual sensor MD 
and GPR—into one system designed specifically for use in humanitar-
ian demining operations. MD and GPR emit audio-signal output to 
the operator. The detector is designed to operate initially in MD mode, 
where all metal threats are noted. GPR mode then confirms presence 
of a threat. MD audio gives accurate positioning information and can 
indicate a mass of metal. GPR provides accurate positional and depth 
information, including information on the target’s radar cross section. 
GPR responds to even the smallest mines buried flush with the soil but 
does not respond to small metal fragments. This results in the rejection 
of false alarms caused by metallic clutter such as cartridge casings, small 
pieces of shrapnel and metallic debris.
The operator can choose to work exclusively with MD, GPR or both 
simultaneously. Furthermore, a gated mode is available in which GPR is 
only activated when MD detects metal. This mode minimizes the num-
ber of undesired GPR alarms, as it is only active when required. VMR3 
has a ready-to-use operational weight of just under 4 kg. With more than 
8 hours of operation, a customized rechargeable battery powers the de-
tector without requiring frequent recharging.
MD of VMR3 has a semiautomatic setup procedure for mineralized 
soils, which can adapt to current soil conditions in less than 30 seconds. 
The specific setup for soil is kept in VMR3’s nonvolatile memory, hence 
setup for mineralized soil is only necessary when soil changes, but not 
after turning the system on or off.
GPR of VMR3 has optional, advanced setup parameters, allowing 
users to tailor the system to the requested detection needs and facilitat-
ing the increase of clutter-rejection efficiency. Not only can GPR sen-
sitivity be adjusted but also the detection depth. Two parameters offer 
selections for detection depth: depth from where to start giving alarms 
(start point) and depth that will not be exceeded (stop point). Start point 
is used if detection is carried out under a safe layer, such as snow or grav-
el. Stop point is used to limit detection depth. If objects below the stop 
point cause GPR alarms, they are automatically ignored.
AP Minefields in Cambodia
HALO first began MINEHOUND trials in Cambodia in August 
2010. Vallon and CTS personnel provided training and technical sup-
port in the field. Cambodia was chosen as the location for trials, as 
HALO has successfully used dual sensor detectors with GPR—the U.S. 
Army’s Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS)—
since 2006 in Cambodia. HALO started working with three VMR2 de-
tectors on loan from Vallon and CTS, and from the beginning of 2012, 
the U.S. Army’s HD R&D program provided two additional VMR3 de-
tectors and extra support for the MINEHOUND project in Cambodia.
MINEHOUND detectors were trialed across HALO’s area of op-
erations in northwestern Cambodia (Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, 
Oddar Meanchey and Pailin provinces) on minefields containing pri-
marily anti-personnel (AP) blast mines. The minefields were chosen to 
provide a range of soil and vegetation conditions as well as varying levels 
of metal contamination and different mine threats.
For each minefield, a GPR calibration area was created to deter-
mine appropriate GPR-sensitivity settings for the mine threat and soil 
conditions. Calibration test pieces provided with MINEHOUND were 
used together with nonexplosive mine targets. Smaller mine targets with 
a reduced radar cross section are more difficult to find with GPR, as are 
targets flush with the surface of soil. Therefore two calibration targets 
of each expected type were buried: one flush with the surface and one 
at the national clearance depth (13 cm in Cambodia). The GPR was then 
adjusted, so that all targets were audible with GPR while also minimiz-
ing the number of false alarms on surrounding soil. HALO’s procedures 
require regular checking of the GPR calibration throughout the work 
day, since variations in soil temperature and moisture can significantly 
change sensor performance.
HALO’s existing linear clearance methods, sometimes called lateral 
clearance, comprise marking a 70-cm deep strip of uncleared minefield 
up to 30-m long (a bound) adjoining cleared ground. Vegetation along 
the bound is removed with a strimmer (brush cutter), and then a de-
miner searches the area using a standard hand-held metal detector from 
HALO’s existing fleet of Ebinger and Minelab detectors. The deminer 
places a red wooden disc (chip) on the center of each metal signal, a pro-
cess known as mapping the bound.
Deminers in Cambodia are taught how to calibrate the GPR on the MINE-
HOUND VMR3 using buried test targets chosen for the expected threat 
in the minefield. 
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Once the mapping is complete, the MINEHOUND operator goes 
to each red disc first to check the signal location with the metal detec-
tor function of MINEHOUND and then to check for a GPR return. The 
detector head’s center is scanned over the red disc from two different 
angles to ensure signal level consistency. If any GPR sound is heard, 
which might indicate presence of a mine, the red chip is left in place. 
If no GPR audio signal is emitted, the red disc is replaced with a blue 
one. Once this chip-flipping process is complete, the ground under the 
red discs (the true alarms) is investigated using standard manual ex-
cavation methods. The blue discs (false alarms) are then rapidly exca-
vated using an adapted brush cutter with a digging head, (also known 
as a clutternator).
This clearance method allows one MINEHOUND operator to 
check signals in the bounds of up to five other deminers and thus 
increase clearance rates, as the majority of signals are checked and 
excavated in a matter of seconds rather than minutes.
Results in Cambodia
Trials in Cambodia started in August 2010, and the initial three 
months were conducted as a data-collection exercise in live minefields. 
This was done without rapid excavation of blue chips, which was intro-
duced in October 2010 after sufficient confidence had been gained in the 
system’s capabilities and reliability. Since then, all clearance has been in 
fully live conditions.
Teams with MINEHOUND support cleared 573,109 sq m 
from August 2010 to December 2013 and encountered 661,890 
metal signals, of which 92% were marked as clutter with blue 
chips. In addition, 845 landmines and other explosive rem-
nants of war (ERW) were correctly identified. There have been 
no incidents where the detector has incorrectly indicated a 
metal signal when it was actually a landmine. The vast ma-
jority of ERW found were AP blast mines (Type 72 AP, PMN, 
PMN-2, MD-82B, MN-79, PMD-6), but some were fragmenta-
tion mines (Type 69, POMZ), anti-tank (AT) mines (TM-46) 
and other ammunition, such as mortars.
The proportion of metal signals that were not mines, yet 
were correctly marked with blue chips and could be rapidly ex-
cavated, increased from a low of 78% in 2010 to 95% in 2013. 
Overall this clutter-rejection rate is not expected to increase 
significantly in the future, although some variation exists be-
tween minefields and conditions.
The area of ground cleared by a deminer each day heavily 
depends on signal density: the number of metal signals in the 
soil at the site. Heavily contaminated areas require more time 
to excavate metal signals and thus less ground can be cleared 
per day. This is true even when a proportion of the metal sig-
nals can be rapidly excavated as is possible when using MINE-
HOUND. Figure 1 shows the results of MINEHOUND teams 
in 2012 and 2013. Each cross represents one day’s work for a 
MINEHOUND team. The overall trend in productivity as sig-
nal density increases can be clearly seen. Figure 1 also reveals 
that, most of the time, the teams worked in areas with signal 
densities within the range of 0.5–2.5 signals per sq m. The red 
crosses in the same figure show a sample of comparative results 
for standard metal detectors. These are clustered much more in 
the range of 0.0–0.5 signals per sq m; at higher signal densities 
the MINEHOUND clearance rates are generally higher.
Although like-for-like comparisons have somewhat limited 
value due to the number of variables affecting clearance rates, 
Figure 2 illustrates the relative productivity of different meth-
ods for different signal densities. When metal signals are rela-
tively few, the advantage of using MINEHOUND is small and 
usually involves a 10–20% boost in clearance rates. However, produc-
tivity is doubled in areas with more metal. A standard clearance team 
consists of nine deminers, one of whom is usually cutting vegetation 
with a strimmer. While MINEHOUND teams also have nine deminers, 
one uses MINEHOUND and another conducts rapid excavation of blue 
chips. These productivity figures consider each deminer equally.
Limitations
In general, HALO found MINEHOUND to be effective for the ma-
jority of Cambodia’s terrain types and mine threats. However, it can-
not be efficiently used in some conditions. In minefields with very rocky 
ground, it is not always possible to find space to swing the detector head 
over metal signals at the optimum height for GPR to function correctly. 
Such metal signals cannot be marked as clutter, negatively affecting the 
clutter-rejection rate and thus the overall clearance rates. Moreover, soil 
with a very uneven surface—for example, old plowed furrows hardened 
over time—can be very challenging for GPR. In these conditions, tuning 
out false alarms from the soil surface is sometimes impossible while cor-
rectly identifying small AP mines flush with the surface. Both of these 
minefield types are the exception rather than the rule in HALO’s area of 
operations in Cambodia; hence, moving teams to areas where they can 
be more effective is possible.
Good MINEHOUND performance almost entirely depends on 
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Figure 1. Area cleared per deminer per day.
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Figure 2. Productivity increases due to MINEHOUND.
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quiring a detailed understanding of vari-
ous settings and factors that can affect radar 
signal. Learning how to do this takes time, 
but HALO’s Cambodian training team has 
taught new operators effectively. Actually 
using the detector to check metal signals is 
very straightforward and does not require 
any difficult techniques.
AT Minefields in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, HALO is trialing 
MINEHOUND detectors to assist with clear-
ance of minimum-metal AT mines. This work 
is concentrated in the western province of 
Herat, where the Mujahedeen sparsely laid 
minimum-metal AT mines, in particular the 
Italian TC series and other low-metal AT 
mines, over large areas in the 1980s to impede 
Soviet military action across the desert plains. 
Although the density of mines is very low, 
they continue to cause accidents, often with 
multiple fatalities, and block access to valu-
able agricultural land.
The mine threat and very different soil and 
conditions, which include dry sandy soils and 
gravel with rocks but little vegetation, pro-
vide a different challenge for MINEHOUND 
when compared to Cambodia. HALO has 
two VMR3 detectors in Afghanistan as part 
of an operational field evaluation in conjunc-
tion with HD R&D. They are currently used in 
minefields that do not contain AP mines. Method of use is similar to 
Cambodia in that MINEHOUND checks positive signals that were pre-
viously identified by Minelab F3S detectors, which are sensitive enough 
to find all AT mine types required. 
However, calibration of MINEHOUND’s GPR in Afghanistan is dif-
ferent than in Cambodia. Two explosive-free TC 2.4 AT mines, with 
their main explosive charge replaced with lime mortar, were used as cal-
ibration targets. One was buried at a depth of 20 cm, while the other was 
flush with the surface of the soil. This calibration meant that only very 
large anomalies in the soil or large metal items would give GPR return. 
The TC 2.4 is used for calibration, as it has the smallest cross section of 
the expected mine types.
MINEHOUND detectors in Herat are deployed in support of man-
ual deminers who are searching ground using Minelab F3S detectors. 
The deminers place red chips on metal signals, and MINEHOUND 
is then used to check for a GPR return. If GPR return is positive, the 
operator leaves the red chip in place; if negative, the operator leaves 
a blue chip. Red chips are investigated carefully using standard exca-
vation techniques; blue chips are removed rapidly using a shovel. One 
MINEHOUND can support more than 20 deminers employing this 
methodology. 
Trials have been conducted on MINEHOUND GPR ground-search 
methods that omit use of a metal detector. Although believed to be 
reliable, this method is not suited for most scenarios, as the detector can 
only sweep relatively slowly due to GPR’s limited detection area. This 
means that a single MINEHOUND can only cover about 250 sq m per 
day. While this may have an advantage in areas with very high levels of 
metal contamination, it is more efficient to have MINEHOUND support 
20 other deminers marking positive signals using other detectors in areas 
with less metal. In this way MINEHOUND can assist with clearance of 
more than 700 sq m of ground per day.
Results in Afghanistan
From the beginning of the trial in September 2012 through the end 
of December 2013, two MINEHOUND detectors checked 197,044 metal 
signals and marked 99% as clutter. Six minimum-metal AT mines were 
found, and 432,082 sq m of minefield were cleared. On average, 32,841 
metal signals were encountered for each mine found; all except 321 of 
these could be excavated by shovel.
The Afghanistan results show a generally higher clutter-rejection rate 
than in Cambodia. This is most likely due to larger radar cross section 
of AT mines, which effectively increases probability of detection while 
also reducing probability of a false alarm. Because the calibration targets 
are much larger, GPR can be set at a far less sensitive setting than if AP 
targets were used. The consistent minefield terrain, weather conditions 
and lack of vegetation and roots likely contributed to this. The large, flat 
areas forming the majority of the minefields in Herat make them ideal 
for MINEHOUND. The few false alarms giving a GPR return were most 
often large pieces of metal fragmentation, scrap or plastic containers with 
a foil layer.
Conclusion
Trial results reported from Cambodia and Afghanistan show that 
MINEHOUND is extremely effective in reducing the false alarm rate en-
countered by generic metal detectors. Average reduction in false alarm 
rate was better than 90% in Cambodia on AP minefields and 99% in 
Afghanistan on AT minefields. HALO’s method of operation is a major 
component of this outcome. Using MINEHOUND as a confirmatory de-
tector to filter out false alarms enables a highly cost-effective deployment. 
Rapid excavation of false alarms is the main reason for increased produc-
tivity. HALO is actively looking at extending trials and deployment of 
MINEHOUND to other parts of its global operations to take advantage 
of customizable GPR.
A MINEHOUND VMR3 in an AT minefield in Afghanistan. The large size of the expected mines 
means that the GPR can be calibrated to ignore nearly all other signals.
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Although the MINEHOUND is signifi-
cantly more expensive to purchase than stan-
dard MD, the improved productivity and 
reduction in labor required for clearing high-
ly contaminated minefields should cover the 
cost of the initial investment within one to 
two years. In the future, overall cost per 
square meter should be reduced in areas with 
high signal densities compared to using stan-
dard MD alone. 
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